Proposes an innovative rethinking of Aristotle’s work as a system that integrates his theology with his doctrine of reproduction and life. In this deep rethinking of Aristotle’s work, Abraham P. Bos argues that scholarship on Aristotle’s philosophy has erred since antiquity in denying the connection between his theology and his doctrine of reproduction and life in the earthly sphere. Beginning with an analysis of God’s role in the Aristotelian system, Bos explores how this relates to other (...) elements of his philosophy, especially to his theory of reproduction. The argument he develops is that in talking about the cosmos, Aristotle rejected Plato’s metaphor of artisanal production by a divine Demiurge in favor of a biotic metaphor based on the transmission of life in reproduction, in which pneuma—not breath as it is often interpreted but the life-bearing spirit in animals and plants—plays a key and sustaining role as the vital principle in all that lives. In making this case, he defends the authenticity of the treatises De Mundo and De Spiritu as Aristotle’s, and demonstrates Aristotle’s works as a unified system that sharply and comprehensively refutes Plato’s, and in particular replaces Plato’s doctrine of the soul with a theory in which the soul is clearly distinguished from the intellect. “Bos offers a fresh, interesting, and important perspective. His interpretation will be very controversial, but if he is right, the standard Anglo-American interpretation of Aristotle will have to change radically.” — Malcolm Wilson, author of Structure and Method in Aristotle’s Meteorologica: A More Disorderly Nature. (shrink)

Ḥeleḳ Rishon, kerekh 1. Teshuvot ha-shayakhot le-Miḳra Midrash ṿe-deʻot ṿe-tsoraf la-hen Sefer Minḥat ḳenaʼot le-R. Aba Mari de-Lunil [Haḳdamah-pereḳ 37] -- Ḥeleḳ Rishon, kerekh 2. Miḳra Midrash ṿe-deʻot Teshuvot ha-shayakhot le-Miḳra Midrash ṿe-deʻot ṿe-tsoraf la-hen Sefer Minḥat ḳenaʼot le-R. Aba Mari de-Lunil [pereḳ 38-pereḳ 127] -- Ḥeleḳ sheni. Teshuvot ha-shayakhot le-Masekhet Berakhot ṿe-Seder Zeraʻim -- Ḥeleḳ shelishi. Teshuvot ha-shayakhot le-Masekhet Shabat ṿe-ʻEruvin.

The psychology of Aristotle has never been understood in a historically correct way. A new interpretation of the De anima will be proposed in which this work can be seen as compatible with the psychology that can be reconstructed from the fragments of Aristotle's lost dialogues and the De motu animalium and other biological works and the doxographical data gathered from ancient writers besides the commentators. In De anima, II, 412b5, where psychè is defined as 'the first entelecheia (...) of a natural body that is organikon,' the words 'natural body' should not be taken to mean 'the body of a living plant, animal or human being' but to stand for 'elementary body.' And the qualification 'organikon' should not be understood as 'equipped with organs' but in the sense of 'serving as an instrument to the soul.' This 'instrumental body' that is inseparably connected with the soul is the seat of desire, which physically influences the parts of the visible body. Besides those two corrections there are the words ta merè in 412b18 that should be taken as meaning not 'parts of the body' but 'parts of the soul.' Aristotle is arguing there that even those parts of the soul that are not yet actualized in the embryo of a new living being can be said to be 'not without body.'. (shrink)

In this article I argue that the heart of Aristotle’s philosophy was his doctrine of pneuma, which connected his psychology, biology, cosmology and theology, and which was central to his (lost and extant) works and should be taken into account, even where it is less explicitly discussed. Pneuma is not a sixth elementary physical body. It is the manifestation of the divine ether but always mixed with the other four elements within the sublunary sphere.

Why do all animals possess sense perception while plants don’t? And should the difference in quality of life between human beings and wolves be explained by supposing that wolves have degenerated souls? This paper argues that for Aristotle differences in quality of life among living beings are based on differences in the quality of their soul-principle together with the body that receives the soul. The paper proposes a new interpretation of On the Soul 2.4.415b18: “For all the natural bodies (...) are instruments of the soul,” against all current interpretations. Aristotle there means that each of the four sublunary elements can be a part of the instrumental body of a soul. The paper continues with discussing the way in which Aristotle connects the several sublunar elements with different levels of life activity, and the troublesome passage in Generation of Animals 3.11.761b22, where Aristotle speaks about a fourth category of living creatures related to the fourth sublunary element, Fire, and the region of the Moon. (shrink)

Trabajando sobre el género de ¿Historias de los Profetas¿ (Qis.as. al-Anbiya-¿) en el proceso de elaboración de mi tesis sobre Abraham en la literatura islámica, el profesor J. Sadan me envió un manuscrito que había localizado en la British Library relacionado con este género. Posteriormente encontré versiones similares de la misma composición, lo que me animó a profundizar mi investigación sobre sus orígenes. La obra está próxima a la literatura de predicación (wa¿z.), que se ocupa principalmente de la educación (...) moral, pero también incluye historias. Me planteé la posibilidad de que éste formarse un género que hubiera surgido como una ayuda, un material auxiliar concebido para entender la tradición oral y los estudios religiosos para, posteriormente, convertirse en un género independiente, más cercano a la Parénesis o al Specula Regis (Espejos de príncipes). Describiré el manuscrito para intentar alcanzar una conclusión sobre ciertas cuestiones: ¿es éste un género literario diferente?, ¿se trata de un género educativo o solamente es una versión simplificada de historias para ilustrar a niños o principiantes de la lengua árabe?, ¿buscaría el autor un nombre original para su compilación, haciendo referencia al reducido tamaño de la colección y descartando el de Qis.as. al-Anbiya-¿ por ser conocido? (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Aristotle on the Etruscan Robbers:A Core Text of "Aristotelian Dualism"Abraham P. Bos (bio)1. A Non-Platonic Dualism in Aristotle's Lost WorksThe Soul of a Mortal on Earth is not "At Home," says Aristotle in his dialogue Eudemus. The story about the mantic dream of the expatriate Eudemus and his expectation that he "will return home"1 is well known. It makes clear that, in Aristotle's view, (...) the death of the human individual should be interpreted as the soul's "return to its homeland."2 This is strongly suggested by "the revelation of Silenus" which Plutarch (first century CE) passes down in a literal quotation from the Eudemus.3 It contains the theme of human life on earth as a punishment (timôria). The motif of human life as a punishment is central to two texts by Iamblichus (250-325 CE) and Augustine (354-430 CE), which are usually connected with Aristotle's Protrepticus.4 I want to examine these texts in more detail here. My intention in the following exposition is to propose a non-Platonistic explanation of these texts. In my opinion they have wrongly been read as testimonies of a "Platonistic" phase in Aristotle. The existence of such a phase in Aristotle's development has never been proved. Besides, the interpretation of these texts suffered from the fact that [End Page 289] Aristotle's De anima had also been explained in an unhistorical way since Alexander of Aphrodisias in the third century CE.2. Revising the Modern View of AristotleWe have to make a different assessment of Aristotle's contribution to the discussion on the soul compared with what was current until recently. For after W. Jaeger5 and F. Nuyens6, modern scholars became inclined to leave Aristotle's dialogues out of consideration, because they regarded them as "Platonizing." But a fundamental correction is necessary on this point.7 Jaeger led modern Aristotle studies in a wrong direction by assuming a sharp distinction between Aristotle's lost dialogue Eudemus and his surviving treatise De anima. Although nowadays Jaeger's theory for many scholars is something of a dead horse, nevertheless a real alternative has not been proposed. We still have to get rid of the consequences of the Jaegerian paradigm and develop a unitary interpretation of Aristotle's entire oeuvre. Even more consistently than O. Gigon has already done,8 we should assume that Aristotle's lost works and his surviving biological writings and De anima did not propose two (or more) different psychological theories but one and the same. Because this one Aristotelian psychology was a non-Platonistic but nevertheless dualistic psychology, we have much more reason than could be recognized in the past to assume Aristotelian influence on this discussion.On one essential issue Aristotle disagreed with his teacher Plato: the soul,9 more particularly the indissoluble bond of the soul with a body. Aristotle radically and [End Page 290] consistently argued for the distinction between nous and psychè.10 For Aristotle the nous-in-act is always wholly incorporeal. But he considered it characteristic of the soul that it cannot carry out its functions "without body."11However, the crucial question is: what body does Aristotle mean when he says that the soul cannot perform its specific activities "without body"? Jaeger and Nuyens were wholly convinced that Aristotle was referring to the visible, external body of a human being, animal, or plant. Hence they saw a yawning gap between Aristotle's views in De anima and his position in the dialogue the Eudemus. In the Eudemus Aristotle had clearly argued that the soul can perform its own functions very well, indeed better, without the galling and oppressive visible body.12 But in De anima II 1, in his famous definition of "the soul," Aristotle says that the soul is inextricably bound up with a "sôma physikon organikon."13 Jaeger and Nuyens, following an almost unanimous tradition since Alexander of Aphrodisias in the third century CE, interpreted this sentence in the sense that the soul is the formal principle or entelechy of an "organic body" or a "natural body equipped with organs," i.e., the visible body... (shrink)

This work analyzes the treatment of biblical metaphor in a Jewish exegetical tradition originating in Muslim Spain that was transplanted to Christian Provence, yielding a variety of approaches that integrate Arabic poetics, hermeneutics and logic with indigenous Hebrew modes of reading.

The Exalted Fath: Ha-Emunah ha-Ramah Transleted by Solomon Ibn Lavi, Ha-Emunah ha-Nissaʼah Transleted by Samuel Ibn Matut, The Anonymous Commentary to HaEmunah ha-Ramah.

Emch, G.G., Liu, C.: The Logic of Thermostatistical Physics. Springer, Berlin/ Heidelberg (2002) 11. Frigg, R., Werndl, C.: Entropy – a guide for the perplexed. Forthcoming in: Beisbart, C., Hartmann, S. (eds.) Probabilities in Physics. Oxford  ...

Levinas Faces Biblical Figures captures the drama of the encounter between a great philosopher and a text of primary importance. The book considers the ways in which Levinas's thoughts can open up the biblical text to requestioning, and how the biblical text can inform our reading of Levinas.

Abraham ibn Ezra d'Espagne (m. 1167) fut l'un des plus importants savants ayant contribué à la transmission de la science arabe à l'Occident. Ses ouvrages en astrologie et en astronomie, rédigés en hébreu puis traduits en latin, étaient considéréd comme faisant autorité par de nombreux savants juifs et Chrétiens. Parmi les ouvrages qu'il a traduits de l'arabe en hébreu, certains sont perdus dans leur langue originale et ses propres ouvrages renferment certaines informations concernant des sources anciennes mal ou pas (...) du tout connues par ailleurs. Ibn Ezra semble être le premier a avoir consigne l'une des sept méthodes pour dresser les maisons astrologiques. Cette méthode avait par la suite été utilisée par Lévi ben Gershom (m. 1344) dans le Midi de la France. (shrink)

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